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Abstract: Many scholars, B. Stock among 
them, pointed to the words in Eriugena’s 
Periphyseon IV 776, which could with good 
reason be described as Eriugena’s cogito, 
namely the words intelligo me esse. Here I 
would like to discuss the special function of 
Scotus’ cogito in his thought. Scotus’ cogito, 
unlike Descartes’, is not meant to ground 
the certainty of the subject’s existence and 
thereby to provide the foundation for the 
certainty of his system. The full meaning of 
Scotus’ cogito is recovered when it is seen 
as a manifestation of hidden God and the 
“locus” for the constitution of the world. 
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Resumen: Muchos estudiosos, entre ellos 
B. Stock, han llamado la atención hacia 
las palabras de Eriúgena en Periphyseon 
IV 776, que pueden describirse con razón 
como el cogito de Eriúgena, a saber, las pa-
labras intelligo me esse. Aquí quiero discutir 
la función especial del cogito de Escoto en 
su pensamiento. El cogito de Escoto, a dife-
rencia del de Descartes, no pretende fundar 
la certeza de la existencia del sujeto, ni por 
lo tanto fundar la certeza de su sistema. El 
signiﬁ cado del cogito de Escoto se recupera 
cuando se ve como manifestación del Dios 
oculto y el “lugar” para la constitución del 
mundo.
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1. INTRODUCTION
B rian Stock pointed out that in Scotus’ Periphyseon we ﬁ nd two distinct passages in which the conception of the cogito is expressed1. Undoubtedly, the better known of the two is the 
passage in Periphyseon IV, in which Eriugena states:
Although I know that I am, my knowledge of myself is not 
prior to myself because I and the knowledge by which I know 
myself are not two different things: if I did not know that I was 
I would not be ignorant that I did not know that I was: there-
fore whether I know or do not know that I am I shall not be 
without knowledge: for there will remain the knowledge of my 
ignorance. And if everything which is able to know that it does 
not know itself cannot be ignorant of the fact that it is (for if it 
did not have any existence at all it would not know that it did 
not know itself) it follows that absolutely everything has exist-
ence which knows that it is or knows that it does not know that 
it is. But if anyone is so far sunk in ignorance that he neither 
knows that he is nor perceives that he does not know that he 
is, I should say that either such a one is not a man at all, or that 
he is altogether dead2.
My objective in this paper is modest enough: it is to quote a number 
of new arguments in support of Brian Stock’s masterly analysis of 
1. Cf. B. STOCK, Intelligo me esse: Eriugena’s ‘Cogito’, in Jean Scot Erigene et l’histoire 
de la philosophie (Ed. R. Roques, Paris, 1977) 328.
2. ERIUGENA, Periphyseon IV, 776 B-C, tr. by J. J. O’Meara (Bellarmin-Montreal, 
Dumbarton Oaks-Washington, 1987) 423; IOHANNIS SCOTTI SEU ERIUGENAE, 
Periphyseon. Liber quartus (Ed. E. Jeauneau [further: PP IV, Jeauneau, CCCM 
164], Turnholti, 2000) 51: “Scio enim me esse, nec tamen me praecedit scientia 
mei, quia non aliud sum et aliud scientia qua me scio; et si nescirem me esse, 
non nescirem ignorare me esse. Ac per hoc, sive scivero, sive nescivero me esse, 
scientia non carebo: Mihi enim remanebit scire ignorantiam meam. Et si omne 
quod potest nescire se ipsum, [nescire] non potest ignorare se ipsum esse (nam si 
penitus non esset, non sciret se ipsum nescire), conﬁ citur omnino esse omne quod 
scit se esse, vel scit se nescire se esse. [Si quis autem tanta ignorantia obrutus est, 
ut nec se ipsum esse sciat, nec nescire se ipsum esse sentiat, aut penitus talem non 
esse hominem, aut omnino extinctum dixerim]”.
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this problem contained in his article and thus to contribute to the 
development of his idea. In the course of his analysis of the Peri-
physeon text and discussing points of similarity as well as differences 
between Augustine, Eriugena and Descartes, Brian Stock comes to 
afﬁ rm:
For despite similarities in word and even thought one essential 
difference remains. Descartes says, I think, therefore I am; Au-
gustine, I am, therefore I think. Eriugena’s place is somewhere 
between the two. Like Augustine, his afﬁ rmation is esse. But in-
stead of just answering doubt, he pursues the consequences of 
Intelligo me esse within a system that places great weight on the 
active intelligence. His position is a ‘phenomenology’ in which 
intelligo and esse are to be read together. For both Augustine 
and Eriugena ignorance is the result of sin and a replica of the 
Trinity is permanently imprinted on the mind as a foretaste of 
grace. But in Eriugena it is a docta ignorantia. The divine triad is 
not a receptacle of divine illumination. Man, as God’s ofﬁ cina, 
directly reﬂ ects his maker. In Augustine, esse is an existential 
question; in Eriugena ousia is phenomenological. There is no 
parallel in Augustine for Eriugena’s transcendental subjectiv-
ism, as illustrated in the proof of other minds. In this, Eriugena 
does not anticipate Descartes but Husserl3.
I follow the meaning that Scotus’ conception of the intelligo is as 
an constitutive act: for it is precisely human mind that is the locus 
of manifestation of what is being created and what paradigmati-
cally, as an exemplar, is located in the Divine Word (God’s Virtus 
Gnostica). For this reason man can rightly be described as the ofﬁ cina 
omnium, the “workshop,” in which the reality of created things is 
being forged, that is, in which created beings become reality. This 
3. B. STOCK, Intelligo me esse cit., 334. Cf. D. MORAN, Christian Neoplatonism and the 
Phenomenological Tradition: The Hidden Inﬂ uence of John Scottus Eriugena, in W. OT-
TEN, I. ALLEN (eds.), Eriugena and Creation (Brepols, Turnholti, 2014) 601 and f.
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revelation of all things in man’s mind is the clearest mark of man’s 
likeness to the Word, the Logos which is “the Father’s Speech” in 
which the Father’s inner depths are revealed. Thus the intelligo in 
Scotus is given a function which is speciﬁ c to his system: this is not 
so much to be the source of certainty for the thinking self of its own 
existence, but rather as the locus of the inaccessible God manifest-
ing Himself.
2. INTELLIGO
Catherine Wilson drew a comparison between the conceptions of 
St Augustine and Descartes and was able to ﬁ nd quite a number 
of essential points of similarity bringing the two doctrines close to 
each other. Among these was the assumption that sense experience 
is a source of prejudices and should be rejected, that the human soul 
is an incorporeal substance, that we possess an innate idea of God 
and that the existence of sin and evil in general has to be reconciled 
with God’s goodness4. Perhaps, provocatively, one might say, that 
Eriugena’s proposals go further and penetrate deeper: for him the 
human soul is incorporeal (as it is in Augustine and Descartes) but it 
contains in itself the totality of corporeal being, man is God’s image 
and God’s idea constituted in the Divine Mind; and it is man’s fall 
that introduced evil into the world, God’s Goodness being alto-
gether free from blame.
To throw more light upon these seemingly paradoxical asser-
tions let’s begin with an analysis of the passage in the Periphyseon 
where — as B. Stock has shown5 — Eriugena introduces his intelligo 
for the ﬁ rst time:
Thus, when I say, ‘I understand that I am’, do I not imply in 
this single verb, ‘understand’, three (meanings) which cannot 
be separated from each other? For I show that I am, and that I 
4. Cf. C. WILSON, Descartes and Augustine, in J. BROUGHTON, J. CARRIERO (eds.), A 
Companion to Descartes (Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, 2011) 41.
5. Cf. B. STOCK, Intelligo me esse cit., 328 and f.
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can understand that I am, and that I do understand that I am. 
Do you not see that by the one verb are denoted my ousia and 
my power, and my act? For I would not understand if I were 
not, nor would I understand if I lacked the power of under-
standing, nor does that power remain latent in me, but breaks 
forth in the operation of understanding6.
At an earlier point in his work Eriugena explained that there are 
these three elements present in every created being, whether cor-
poreal or incorporeal, the elements that are both indestructible and 
inseparable from each other, namely: ousia/essentia, dynamis/virtus 
and energeia/operatio7. These elements made their appearance at an 
earlier stage in the development of Neoplatonic philosophy, e. g. in 
Proclus where they were invoked to describe the process of causal 
action in Proclus’ objective theory8. Eriugena applies them speciﬁ -
cally to the explanation of the way human knowledge functions 
(subjective theory).
What Eriugena suggests in this passage appears to be very 
close to the intention of Augustine’s Si enim fallor, sum, as it shows 
that the power (virtus) of thinking and the very process of thinking 
(operatio) reveal the fact of being of an I (quia), which does not imply, 
that the I comprehends the “what” (quid) of its being (what an I is). 
Thus the intelligo reveals the fact of human existence, yet the very 
essence of man still remains concealed. To be able to afﬁ rm that he 
knows his own essence, man would have to be able to give his own 
essential deﬁ nition (ousiades) in which he would have do limit the 
6. PP I 490 B, p. 82-83; Cf. IOHANNIS SCOTTI SEU ERIUGENAE, Periphyseon. Liber 
primus (Ed. E. Jeauneau [further: PP I, Jeauneau, CCCM 161], Turnholti 1996) 
67: “Dum ergo dico ‘intelligo me esse’, nonne in hoc uno verbo quod est ‘intel-
ligo’ tria signiﬁ co a se inseparabilia? Nam et me esse, et posse intelligere me 
esse, et intelligere me esse demonstro. Num vides uno verbo et meam OUCIAN 
meamque virtutem et actionem signiﬁ cari? Non enim intelligerem si non essem; 
neque intelligerem si virtute intelligentiae carerem; nec illa virtus in me silet sed 
in operationem intelligendi prorumpit”.
7. Cf. PP I 490 A, p. 82.
8. Cf. PROCLUS, The Elements of Theology 27, 77, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1963) 31, 
73. Cf. S. GERSH, From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the Prehistory and 
Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Brill, Leiden 1978) 82.
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boundaries of his own nature, which, according to Eriugena, is im-
possible. For to him deﬁ nition is the “locus” of the deﬁ ned reality, 
and consequently its delimitation and description9. Implied in this 
conception is a redeﬁ nition (peculiar to Eriugena) of the concepts of 
time and place; and none of the created things can be conceived of 
without time and place. Thus a place is the “natural deﬁ nition and 
mode and position of each creature,” while time is “the beginning of 
movement of things through generation from not-being into being, 
and the ﬁ xed measurement of this motion of changeable things”10.
If this is the way one deﬁ nes time and movement, then it be-
comes clear, that deﬁ ning and measuring presupposes a mind that 
performs both these operations. The mind in question is human 
mind, in which all things undergo a “second creation”11. Now the 
essential question that here arises is that concerning the particu-
lar mode in which this second creation, or positing of all things in 
human mind, is carried out, in particular whether this second crea-
tion regards the essential or only the accidental being. If the ﬁ rst 
alternative is accepted, that is if it is assumed that the very essences 
of all things were created in man, then it would appear to follow, 
that only part of the Universe could have been created in man, to 
the exclusion of all accidental reality. Yet if, on the other hand, we 
assume, that absolutely all reality was produced in man, it would ap-
9. Cf. C. D’AMICO, Locus und defﬁ nitio bei Eriugena und Cusanus, in A. KIJEWSKA, 
R. MAJERAN, H. SCHWAETZER (eds.), Eriugena-Cusanus (Lublin Catholic Univer-
sity Publishing House, Lublin, 2011) 171 and f.; cf. M. VOLLET, Raum und Grenze 
bei Eriugena and Cusanus, in Eriugena-Cusanus cit., 193 and f.; C. STEEL, Maximus 
Confessor and John Scottus Eriugena on Place and Time, in Eriugena and Creation cit., 
291 and f.
10. PP I 483 B-C, 74; JEAUNEAU, op. cit., 58: “Ac per hoc concluditur nil aliud esse 
locum nisi naturalem difﬁ nitionem modumque positionemque uniuscuiusque sive 
generalis sive specialis creaturae, quemadmodum nil aliud est tempus nisi rerum 
per generationem motionis ex non esse in esse inchoationem ipsiusque motus 
rerum mutabilium certae dimensiones donec veniat stabilis ﬁ nis, in quo immuta-
biliter Omnia stabunt”. Cf. B. STOCK, Intelligo me esse cit., 329.
11. Cf. J. TROUILLARD, Erigène et la théophanie créatrice, in Jean Scot Erigène. Etudes 
(F. Berland, Paris 2014) 71: “La connaissance implique une création, et il n’est 
d’efﬁ cacité authentique que dans la pensée. Celle-ci est la substance des êtres. 
De même que Dieu se crée en pensant l’univers et que l’univers a son être dans 
la pensée divine, ainsi l’homme se réalise en se connaissant et en connaissant les 
choses, et la nature a sa véritable consistance dans l’esprit humain”.
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pear to follow, that man was a conglomerate of diverse heterogene-
ous elements, a kind of “monster”12. Since neither solution appears 
to be satisfactory, a third way out must be sought after.
3. KNOWING - CREATING
The escape from this dilemma has been found by Eriugena in the 
conception that was one of the formative principles of Neoplaton-
ist thought, namely to the principle that “the spiritual world was 
not only a hierarchy of causation but also one of cognition”13. This 
principle directly followed from the assumption adopted in Neo-
platonism that true causality is only attributable to the sphere of the 
immaterial (e.g. the Demiurge), and the most perfect activity of an 
immaterial agent is the activity of cognition14.
Now, human mind is immaterial too and human mind can, 
too, be regarded as a “smithy,” where all things are being “forged” 
(ofﬁ cina omnium)15 yet this is not to say that God literarily, in some 
corporeal way, somehow produces these things within the structure 
of man. As John Gavin puts it, a man is “the primordial knower, the 
ﬁ eld of the ﬁ rst creation”16. All things are made in man as he comes 
to know all things by means of the concepts he has of them in his 
mind. A direct reversal of the order in the process of knowing as-
sumed in the Aristotelian school is accepted in Eriugena: man is no 
longer represented as knowing by means of abstracting the contents 
of his concepts of things from the material delivered to him by his 
sense experience. Quite the reverse is true in Eriugena: it is the very 
things, the objects of knowing that get constituted owing to human 
acts of comprehension and knowing.
12. Cf. PP IV 764 D-765 B, JEAUNEAU, op. cit., 34-35.
13. S. E. GERSH, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and 
Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Brill, Leiden, 1978) 82.
14. Stephen Gersh presents the roots of the doctrine in Proclus’ philosophy. Cf. 
there, 111.
15. Cf. IOHANNIS SCOT SEU ERIUGENAE, Periphyseon. Liber tertius (further: PP III), 
733 B (Ed. E. Jeauneau, CCCM 163, Brepols, Turnholti, 1999) 369.
16. J. GAVIN, The Incarnational Vision of John Scottus Eriugena, “Archa Verbi. Yearbook 
for the Study of Medieval Theology” 10 (2013) (Aschendorff, Münster, 2014) 51.
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Thus in the Periphyseon the “Nourisher” (Nutritor) sets his 
pupil (the Alumnus) the following question: “It is your opinion that 
everything which is known by the intellect or the reason or im-
agined by the sense can somehow be created and produced in the 
knower and perceiver?”17. The pupil in response rightly quotes St. 
Augustine and afﬁ rms that this indeed must be the case since the 
very knowledge of the Word subject to the senses is more perfect 
than these very things themselves18:
I believe — says Alumnus — that the same relationship pro-
ceeds from the Divine Providence through all creation, so that 
not only every nature which has the knowledge of that which 
follows it is better and superior, but also the knowledge itself, 
through the dignity of the nature in which it resides, greatly 
excels the object of which it is the knowledge19.
This statement seems obvious enough on the ground of Augustine’s 
philosophy20, especially in what concerns material things, yet doubts 
immediately arise when we consider the immaterial principles ac-
cording to which we issue our judgments on the objects we know. 
The skill in comprehending and applying these principles-norms 
is what in Eriugena’s eyes constitutes mastery, which he calls the 
“skill” par excellence. St Augustine held, on the other hand, that 
these very principles are transcendent with regard to our minds and 
belong within the order of Divine Wisdom. God allows us to have 
access to these principles through his enlightenment and in this way 
He becomes the efﬁ cient factor in our knowing21. 
17. PP IV 765 C, p. 409; JEAUNEAU cit., 35: “Omne quod cognoscitur intellectu et 
ratione, seu corporeo sensu imaginatur, putasne in ipso qui intelligit et sentit quo-
dammodo posse creari et efﬁ ci?”.
18. PP IV 766 A, p. 411 ; Cf. PROCLUS, The Elements of theology 134, 118-119; 173, 
150-151: “In the Intelligence, accordingly, its priors are contained intellectually”.
19. PP IV 766 B, p. 410; JEAUNEAU cit., 36: “Et si ita est, talis ordo, ut reor, ex divina 
providentia per universam creaturam procedit, ut omnis natura, quae sequentis 
se notitiam comprehendit, non solum melior et superior sit, verum etiam et ipsa 
notitia dignitate naturae, in quae est, praecedit eam longe, cuius notitia est”.
20. Cf. ST. AUGUSTINE, De magistro IX, 28.
21. Cf. ST. AUGUSTINE, De magistro XI, 38; Cf. R. H. NASH, Illumination, in A. D. 
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Eriugena does not discard the theory of illumination, yet he 
transforms Augustine’s conception of it, as a consequence of his 
different conception of Divine Ideas. In Augustine exemplarism was 
the doctrine establishing the sphere of Divine Ideas (rationes aeter-
nae) as the rule or regulative principle for all human knowledge; the 
Divine Ideas were conceived of as the eternal patterns for all things 
and yet as Divine Thoughts identical with God himself22. In Scotus 
the Divine Ideas constitute the second nature — the one that both 
creates and is created — and this departs in a way from Augustine’s 
model. The primordial causes (which are the Divine Ideas) can be 
viewed in two perspectives: as viewed with regard to God they are 
considered to be identical with the eternal Word of God and form 
unity with Him; while viewed in relation to creatures they are con-
stituted in human mind and they are pregnant with all those created 
effects that would in due time come out of them23. 
Given these premises, Eriugena proceeds to state that the prin-
ciples of the arts that ﬁ x the structure of the created reality are found 
in the mind of man and along with skill, which is the mastery with 
which they are comprehended, they form the triadic structure of 
human spirit, which “measures” and “deﬁ nes,” that is “constitutes” 
things. Thus the Teacher addresses the Pupil:
[N] It remains then to consider in what way skill and the art 
reside in the mind, whether as those natural qualities which 
are known as potencies, like the species of wisdom and science 
which it perceives in the reﬂ ection of the Divine Ray; or as sub-
stantial and constituent parts of itself, so that mind, skill and 
the art would form a kind of trinity in one essence. [A] Your 
last suggestion is the one which I would accept. For the three 
seem to me to form a kind of substantial and connatural trinity. 
Fitzgerald (ed.), Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia (Eerdmans, Michigan, 
Cambridge, 1999) 438 and f.
22. Cf. W. J. HANKEY, Ratio, Reason, Rationalism, in Augustine through the Ages cit., 
697-698.
23. Cf. JOHANNIS SCOTI SEU ERIUGENAE, Periphyseon. Liber secundus (further: PP II) 
556 B-D, ed. E. Jeauneau, CCCM 162 (Brepols, Turholti, 1997) 158.
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[N] Then mind intellectually comprehends both its skill and 
the art, and is intellectually comprehended both by the one 
and by the other (though not as to what it is, but as to the fact 
that it is). For otherwise, the trinity will not be coessential and 
coequal24. 
The skill and the art which together form a trinitarian union with 
human mind reveal the existence thereof. The mind can “discover” 
the reality of its existence precisely through their “revealing” activ-
ity and for that reason the skill and the art identify with the mind 
and thus constitute unity in plurality. Yet this is not to imply that 
Eriugena reduces — in the most extreme formulation — the sphere 
of ideal patterns to the reality of human thought. True, what he calls 
“the art” identiﬁ es with human mind, yet the triad mind-skill-art is 
only actualized in man when man turns to God. It is by turning to 
God that the full constitution of human mind as a sui generis triadic 
unit is perfected as the moment of return is a necessary complement 
of the cyclic movement of cosmic causation. This cycle contains the 
enduring (mansio) of the effects in the cause, the outﬂ ow of effects 
outside of the cause (processio) and the return of the effects to the 
cause (reversion/reditus)25. The triad of human mind can accomplish 
the process of its constitution, or rather self-constitution by turning 
back towards its Source: 
I do not doubt — Disciple claims — that the trinity of the mind 
is formed by a superior Nature, seeing that all things that are 
formed take from It the origin of their Forms, and it is by being 
24. PP IV 767 C-D, 412-413; JEAUNEAU cit., 39: “[N] Restat igitur considerare quo-
modo ei insunt peritia et disciplina: Num veluti naturales qualitates, quas virtutes 
appellant, ut sunt species sapientiae et scientiae, quas divini radii repercussion 
percipit, an veluti substantiales suas partes, quibus consistit, ita ut quaedam trini-
tas sit unius essentiae, mens, peritia, disciplina? [A] Quod postremo posuisti cre-
diderim. Videtur enim mihi substantialis quaedam et connaturalis trinitas. [N] 
Mens itaque et peritiam et disciplinam suam intelligit, et a sua peritia suaque 
disciplina intelligitur, non quid, sed quia est; aliter enim coessentialis et coaequalis 
trinitatis non erit”. 
25. Cf. S. E. GERSH, From Iamblichus to Eriugena cit., 217-229.
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turned towards It that are formed all things which are turned 
towards It or can be turned towards It. [N] Any hesitation on 
this point would be extremely stupid. So only the Mind of God 
possesses in Itself the true knowledge of the human mind, of its 
skill and of the art, for by It and for It was this trinity formed26.
4. SELF-CONSTITUTION (αυθυποστατον)
Eriugena’s is almost model restatement of another fundamental 
principle of Neoplatonism which establishes that any being can only 
become a true cause if it ﬁ rst constitutes itself27. This self constitu-
tion can only be effected by turning towards a superior Nature in 
contemplation and thereby receiving from that Nature the form 
that is proper to the self-constituting reality28. The conception of 
auqupostaton as Eric Dodds has convincingly shown, played a sig-
niﬁ cant role in the doctrine of Proclus. To begin with, it introduced 
an element of freedom or, more precisely, indeterminacy, to the 
Neoplatonist conception of reality, since what constitutes itself de-
pends just as much on the higher principle as it does on itself. And 
secondly, an intermediary principles were introduced which medi-
ated between the absolute causality of the Supreme Principle and 
the sphere of simple effects (causata)29. These self-constituting prin-
ciple are made much of by Proclus himself in his Elements of Theology 
where he attributes to them some signiﬁ cant properties: “All that is 
self-constituted is capable of reversion upon itself” (Prop. 42) and 
vice-versa (prop. 43)30. “All that is self-constituted is without tem-
26. PP IV 768 A, p. 413; JEAUNEAU cit., 39: “[A] Iam vero, quoniam superior est ipsa, 
ex qua omnia quae formantur incipiunt formari, et ad quam conversa formantur 
quae ad eam convertuntur aut possunt converti, ab eadem etiam mentis trinitatem 
formari non dubito. [N] Hinc ambigere stultissimum. Sola itaque divina mens 
[notitiam] humanae mentis, peritae, disciplinalis, a se formatae veram possidet 
notionem.
27. Cf. D. MORAN, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the 
Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989) 166 and f.
28. Cf. PROCLUS, The Elements of Theology 31 cit., 35: “All that proceeds form any 
principle reverts in respect of its being upon that form which it proceeds”.
29. Cf. E.R. DODDS, Commentary, in PROCLUS, The Elements of Theology 223-224
30. PROCLUS, Elements of Theology 42, 43, 44-45.
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poral origin” (prop. 45); “All that is self-constituted is imperishable” 
(prop. 46); “All that is self-constituted is without parts and simple” 
(prop. 47); “All that is self-constituted is perpetual” (prop. 49); “All 
that is self-constituted transcends the things which are measured by 
time in respect of their existence”31. The intelligo of Scotus Eriugena 
is exactly alike with respect to these properties.
Human mind, skill, and art, though described by Eriugena 
as “substantial parts” constitute a trinity that is one in its nature, 
though its form derives directly from the Divine Mind. As noted 
above, the other two, that is the skill and the art permeate each 
other and “reveal” the reality of the mind, and this amounts to stat-
ing that the essential feature is self-reﬂ ectivity (ability to turn upon 
itself).
The factor of indeterminacy as characterizing that which 
constitutes itself is signiﬁ cant also for Eriugena’s thought, which 
is strongly marked by intellectualism. Moreover, as John the Scot 
shows, the arts are an eternal possession of the soul that inheres in 
the soul and guarantees its eternity. True the truth may go the other 
way round, that is, perhaps it is the soul that is the foundation of the 
eternity of the arts. Which one of these two ways is the true, does 
not matter, for here we move at the level of intelligibility:
For it has been rightly sought out and found by the philoso-
phers that the arts are eternal and are immutably attached to 
the soul forever, in such a way that they seem to be not some 
kind of accidents of it, but natural powers [and actions] which 
do not and could not withdraw from it, and which do not 
come from anywhere but are innate in it as part of its nature, 
so that it is doubtful whether it is the arts which confer eter-
nity upon it because they are eternal and eternally associated 
with it so that it may be eternal, or whether it is by reason of 
the subject, which is the soul, that eternity is supplied to the 
arts (for the ousia and the Power and the Operation of the 
soul are eternal), or whether they co-inhere in each other, 
31. PROCLUS, Elements of Theology 45,46, 47, 49, 51, 46-51.
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all being eternal, in such a way that they cannot be separated 
from one another32.
5. OFFICINA OMNIUM 
Man, owing to the skill and the art that he possesses in his mind also 
has the mastery of the concepts of all things and these concepts are 
the true substance of everything. Yet this eternal possession does 
not make man the absolute maker of all ideas, but merely accords 
him the status of a kind of “secondary creator,” whose mind is but 
a “place” in which God posits all things, on the condition that man 
turns his mind to God in contemplation. Thus the human consti-
tutive activity is but a manifestation of the true, primary creative 
activity of God.
These problems receive a more detailed treatment in Eriu-
gena’s discussion of the opening lines of Genesis, where he reﬂ ects 
on the problem why God created man as contained in the genus 
of animal, as a “living soul,” while making him at the same time 
an image of God. It appears that there is some duality entailed by 
the act through which God constituted man in being. Following 
the teaching of Gregory of Nyssa, Eriugena refuses to consider the 
creation of man as consisting of two separate acts, one following the 
other in time, he tries to make sense of the two aspects of the Bibli-
cal anthropogenesis as just two sides of one and the same act, each 
of these two having its own foundation and its own consequences. 
In the Periphyseon, the Pupil asks the Teacher whether it might 
not have been more convenient to constitute man solely as a spir-
itual being and not in the genus of animals, since man’s ultimate 
32. PP I, 486 C-D, 78; JEAUNEAU cit., 62-63: “Siquidem a philosophis veraciter 
quaesitum repertumque est artes esse aeternas et semper immutabiliter animae 
adhaerere ita ut non quasi accidentia quaedam ipsius esse videantur, sed naturales 
virtutes actionesque nullo modo ab ea recedentes nec recedere valentes nec ali-
unde venientes sed naturaliter ei insitas, ita ut ambiguum sit utrum ipsae aeter-
nitatem ei praestant quoniam aeternae sunt eique semper adhaereant ut aeterna 
sit, an ratione subiecti quod est anima artibus aeternitas administratur —OYCIA 
enim animae et virtus et actio aeternae sunt —an ita sibi invicem coadhaereant, 
dum omnes aeternae sint, ut a se invicem segregari non possint”.
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destiny was to achieve equality with the angelic nature33. The an-
swer given to that by the Teacher is very characteristic and typical 
of the Eriugenian rationalism, though one can here discern an echo 
of Augustine’s teaching34: 
When you ask why God should have created man, whom He 
proposed to make in His own Image, in the genus of animals, 
it should be enough for me to reply brieﬂ y that He wished so 
to fashion him that there might be one among the animals in 
which His Image was expressly manifested. But if one goes on 
to ask why He wished to do so, he is enquiring into the causes 
of the Divine Will, an enquiry which is over-presumptuous 
and arrogant35.
Thus the Nourisher does not propose to inquire into the profound 
reasons for God’s project to create man in a kind of dual condition; 
this inquiry exceeds the powers of human understanding and would 
smack of arrogance and presumption. On the other hand he does 
not wish to discourage his pupil’s eager desire for understanding, 
so he proceeds to throw some light on the mystery of man’s origin 
by going into the effects of God’s creative action in the created 
world. He goes on to state that God wished his image to be re-
vealed in and through the animal nature of man, because man was 
designed by God as a representative in contracted form of the whole 
of created reality or — to use Gregory of Nyssa’s expression — as 
a microcosm36, or the “third world”. Owing to the dual creation of 
man as an animal and as a divine image man’s ontological structure 
encompasses all created orders, and his own nature appears as the 
33. Por. PP IV 763 A-B, 406-407.
34. Cf. AUGUSTINUS, De Genesi adversus Manicheos I, II, 4.
35. PP IV 763 C-D, 407; JEAUNEAU cit., 32: “Et mihi sufﬁ ceret interroganti tibi quare 
deus hominem in genere animalium creaverit, quem ad suam imaginem facere 
proposuit, breviter respondere: Quia ita voluit eum condere, ut quoddam animal 
esset, in quo imaginem suam expressam manifestaret. Cur autem ita voluit quis-
quis quaerit, divinae voluntatis causas quaerit, quas quaerere nimis praesumpti-
vum est atque superbum”.
36. Cf. PP IV, 793 C, 444.
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keystone and the crowning of the whole Universe. By creating man 
God created at the same time all other created natures:
For among the wise it is maintained that in man is contained 
the universal creature. For, like the angel, he enjoys the use 
of Mind and Discursive Reason; and like the animal, the use 
of physical sense and the capacity to administer his body: and 
therefore his nature is understood to include that of every crea-
ture. For the whole of creation is divided into ﬁ ve parts: the 
creature may be either a body; or a living being; or a sensi-
ble being; or a rational being; or an intellectual being. And all 
these ﬁ ve parts are in every way found in man37.
In the Genesis narrative of the act of creation the account of the cre-
ation of man comes at the end, on the sixth day, and this emphasizes 
the perfection of man as a being which comprises in its constitution 
the totality of created reality. There is nothing within the created 
realm that exceeds the boundaries of man’s nature:
So the reason why man is introduced at the conclusion of the 
narrative of the equipping of this visible world is that we might 
understand that all the things of which the creation is nar-
rated before that of man are universally comprehended within 
him. For every greater number includes within itself the lesser 
(…). But as it is, since the creation of man is introduced at the 
conclusion of all divine operations, it is shown that the divine 
creations all subsist and are comprehended in him38.
37. PP IV 755 B-C, 396-397; JEAUNEAU cit., 21: “Constat enim inter sapientes in 
homine universam creaturam contineri: Intelligit enim et ratiocinatur ut angelus, 
sentit et corpus administrat ut animal, ac per hoc omnis creatura in eo intelligitur. 
Totius siquidem creaturae quinquepertita divisio est: aut enim corporea est, aut 
vitalis, aut sensiva, aut rationalis, aut intellectualis. Et haec omnia omni modo in 
homine continentur”. Cf. PP IV 764 B, 408.
38. PP IV, 782 C-D, 431; JEAUNEAU cit., 60: “Proinde post mundi visibilis ornatus 
narrationem introducitur homo, veluti omnium conclusio, ut intelligeretur quod 
omnia quae ante ipsum condita narrantur, in ipso universaliter comprehenduntur. 
Omnis enim numerus maior minorem intra se numerum concludit (…). Iam vero, 
quoniam in ﬁ ne omnium divinorum operum introducitur, omnia divina opera in 
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6. MAN - THE CONCEPT IN THE DIVINE MIND
There is, nevertheless, an important restriction imposed on man’s 
intelligo, even when it is considered as an act of constituting or pos-
iting of all understood things. For while man is in possession of 
the concepts of all created things, he cannot possess the concept of 
himself. In the above we have already mentioned that human mind, 
while capable of knowing with certainty that it is, does not know its 
own constitution, its own quid, which remains veiled for its insight39. 
For clearly, the concept of man’s being can only be found in the 
very Divine Mind, the ultimate creative principle; it is this ultimate 
principle and the idea of human being contained therein that forms 
the absolute ontological foundation of man’s reality as well as man’s 
cognitive activity, which nevertheless is also creative in its own re-
duced way and consists in positing the cognized things:
[A] For I understand the substance of the whole man to be 
nothing else but the concept of him in the Mind of his Artiﬁ -
cer, Who knew all things in Himself before they were made; 
and that very knowledge is the true and only substance of the 
things known, since it is in that knowledge that they are most 
perfectly created and eternally and immutably subsist. [N] We 
may then deﬁ ne man as follows: Man is a certain intellectual 
concept formed eternally in the Mind of God. [A] That is an 
extremely true and very well tested deﬁ nition of man; and not 
only of man, but of everything else which is formed in the 
Divine Wisdom40.
ipso subsistere et comprehendi manifestantur”.
39. Cf. A. KIJEWSKA, Eriugena on the ineffability of God, in VON H. SCHWAETZER, 
M.-A. VANNIER (eds.), Der Bildbegriff bei Meister Eckhart und Nikolaus von Kues 
(Aschendorff, Münster, 2015) 171 and f. 
40. PP IV, 768 B, 413; Cf. PP IV, JEAUNEAU cit., 40: “Immo vero intelligo non aliam 
esse substantiam totius hominis nisi suam notionem in mente artiﬁ cis, qui omnia 
priusquam ﬁ erent in se ipso cognovit, ipsamque cognitionem substantiam esse 
veram ac solam eorum quae cognita sunt, quoniam in ipsa perfectissime facta et 
aeternaliter et immutabiliter subsistunt”. Cf. PP IV, 770B, A. 416.
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God’s mind is the locus of man, just as human mind is the locus of 
created things; for it is in the Divine Mind that the “description” or 
“deﬁ nition” of man’s nature is found. For this reason all intellectual 
activity properly human has to begin by man’s turning to the Divine 
Mind, whence man receives his form, and this reception of form 
means that the function of intelligo is given its full constitution. This 
is how the properly human activity of intelligere and of constitution 
of things through intelligere ﬁ nds its proper place between the Di-
vine Source and the created outﬂ ow of things as a crucial mediating 
factor in the process of constituting the created reality.
7. NAMING
The original concepts of all things created dwell in human mind. 
Man projects the things he has the concepts of via his skill (in the 
special sense given to this notion by Eriugena) and art and he gives 
names to the produced things. This is another aspect highlight-
ing the constitutive power of human mind: whatever exists can be 
named and only that exists that can be named. Eriugena discusses 
the process of imposition of names with reference to Gen (2, 19) 
where Adam is represented as giving names to all things. Adam and 
his action are the archetype of all human activity, for he is the epit-
ome of human nature as such41. The imposition of names, which 
follows on the constitution of things, is an act by which man afﬁ rms 
his power over things. Man can only name that, of which he pos-
sesses the concepts and over which he can exercise domination; thus 
it is clear that he can possess neither the concept nor the essential 
deﬁ nition of either himself or, with even more reason, of God:
 …and indeed the essence of man is understood principally to 
consist in this: that it has been given him to possess the con-
cept of all things which were either created his equals or which 
he was instructed to govern. For how could man be given the 
domination of things of which he had not the concept? For his 
41. Cf. A. KIJEWSKA, Eriugena on the ineffability of God cit., 167 and f.
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dominion over them would go astray if he did not know the 
things which he was to rule. Holy Scripture gives us a clear in-
dication of this when it says: ‘Therefore, having formed out of 
the earth every beast of the ﬁ eld and every bird of the heavens, 
the Lord God brought them unto Adam to see what he would 
call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living soul that 
is its name’. (…) But what he called anything that is its name, 
that is, it is the very notion of the living soul42.
Adam can name only those things, whose concepts are found in his 
mind; he cannot possibly have the concept of himself and conse-
quently, cannot name himself, as this would imply that constitutes 
himself in being. The concept and deﬁ nition of himself dwell in-
stead in God’s mind and it is only through that concept and owing 
to the creative and constitutive activity of the Divine Mind that man 
himself has been called into being and constituted in reality, and it 
is only by God that he could possibly have been named.
This conﬁ rms that in Eriugena’s system the ruling principle 
is the rigorous hierarchy of cognition, with the higher intelligent 
principle ﬁ xing and describing the lower. In this world ruled by 
intelligence, dialectics must be both the supreme law of being and 
the basic method of scientiﬁ c knowing. 
8. DIALECTICS
In Eriugena’s understanding dialectics was identical to philosophy 
itself; the general understanding of the term dialectics was in Eriu-
gena’s time as the art of disputation, by its nature oriented towards 
42. PP IV 768 C-769 A, 414; JEAUNEAU cit., 41: “Et quidem per hoc maxime intelli-
gitur homo esse quod cunctorum, quae sive aequaliter sibi creata sunt sive quibus 
dominari praecipitur, datum est ei habere notionem. Quomodo enim dominatus 
eorum homini daretur, quorum notionem non haberet? Siquidem dominatus illius 
erraret, si ea quae regeret nesciret. Quod apertissime divina nobis indicat scriptura 
dicens: ‘Formatis igitur dominus deus de humo cunctis animantibus terrae et uni-
versis volatilibus caeli, adduxit ea ad Adam ut videret quid vocaret ea; omne autem 
quod vocavit Adam animae viventis, ipsum est nomen eius.’ (…) ‘Omne autem 
quod vocavit, ipsum est nomen,’ hoc est ipsa notio animae viventis”.
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discovering truth. In Augustinian tradition truth is the same as God, 
so understandably, Eriugena too considers dialectics to be God’s 
gift for man, a divinely sent device to distinguish truth from false-
hood, to set apart what has been mixed up, to reunite what has been 
separated by division43.
But in the realist framework of Eriugena there is more to dia-
lectics than just an efﬁ cient means of setting apart true and untrue 
statements; in fact, the procedures of the dialectical art mirror the 
objective order of reality, there obtains a close correspondence be-
tween the ordo idearum and the ordo rerum. We know already the 
fundamental reason for this correspondence: it is that the order 
of things derives from the order of knowing (including human 
knowing)44. As Giulio d’Onofrio pointed out Eriugena elevated 
dialectics from the level of a mere scientia sermocinalis to the dignity 
of the science that reveals the deepest ontological order. This has 
only been made possible by the fact that human mind, when in-
formed by the Divine Mind, is capable of reﬂ ecting in the order of 
its words and concepts the very hierarchy of creations and their ul-
timate grounding in the unity of the Word45. By means of dialectical 
procedure every thing is accorded its proper place in the hierarchy 
of genera and species and given its proper name which sets it apart 
from all other named things. The hierarchy descends from the most 
universal genera, including the genus generalissimum of substance, 
through the intervening genera of decreasing extension, down to 
the most particular entities; to that which is contaminated with mat-
ter and scattered “outside of” human mind, in other words, to that 
43. Cf. IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, De Praedestinatione VII, 1, ed. E. S. Mainoldi 
(Galluzzo, Firenze, 2003) 70: “Potest enim aliquis in disciplina uerbi causa dis-
putandi quae dicitur dialectica peritus, que nullo dubitante a deo homini donatur, 
si uoluerit bene uti, quoniam ad hoc certissime data est, dum ea ignorantes eam 
erudit, uera falsaque discernit, confusa diuidit, separata colligit, in omnibus ueri-
tatem inquirit”.
44. Cf. Ch. ERISMANN, L’homme commun. La gènese du réalisme ontologique durant le 
haut Moyen Age (Vrin, Paris, 2011) 6-9; cf. Ch. ERISMANN, The Logic of Being: 
Eriugena’s Dialectical Ontology, “Vivarium” 45 (2007) 207.
45. Cf. G. D’ONOFRIO, Bene disputandi disciplina. Procédés dialectique et logica vetus dans 
le langage philosophique de Jean Scot, in G.-H. ALLARD (ed.), Jean Scot –écrivain 
(Montréal-Paris, 1986) 239-240.
AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA
380 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 49/2 (2016) 361-384
which persists at the level of Eriugena’s third nature, the one that is 
created and does not create. The dialectical procession thus retraces 
the order of Porphyry’s tree and this orderly progress is reiterated 
by the discursive development of human logic. Thus dialectics ap-
pears to be the supreme law of development both in knowing and 
in objective reality46. 
Naturally, the objective order of beings revealed and at the 
same time constituted by dialectical procedure, projected and pos-
ited as it is by the human intelligo, is by no means an arbitrary pro-
jection of man. Man’s constitutive activity, or man’s art, works ac-
cording to the principles of that higher art issuing from God the 
Creator himself. Man is by no means the origin, but only an inter-
mediary of the creative act:
From this we may see that that art which concerns itself with 
the division of genera into species and the resolution of spe-
cies into genera, which is called dialektike did not arise form 
human contrivances, but was ﬁ rst implanted in nature by the 
originator of all the arts that are properly so called, and was 
later discovered therein by the sages who make use of it in their 
subtle investigations of reality47.
9. MAN AS KNOWING
As we have already seen, all things (save from man himself) have 
been constituted in human intelligence and persist there in the 
form of concepts. There is no created thing (except for man him-
self) whose concept would not be found in man’s possession. This 
statement is equally true of angelic creations, which have too been 
46. Cf. Ch. ERISMANN, L’homme commun cit., 252 and ff.; Ch. ERISMANN, The Logic 
of Being cit., 213.
47. PP IV, 749 A, 389; JEAUNEAU cit., 12: “Ac per hoc intelligitur quod ars illa, quae 
dividit genera in species, et species in genera resolvit, quaeque DIALEKTIKH 
dicitur, non ab humanis machinationibus sit facta, sed in natura rerum ab auctore 
omnium atrium, quae vere artes sunt, condita, et a sapientibus inventa, et ad uti-
litatem sollertis rerum indagis usitata”.
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constituted in man, or at an equal level with man. Man and angels 
are equals, for in the case of intelligent and rational natures there 
can be no question of primacy, but instead there obtains perfect 
simultaneity and mutuality:
If you look more closely into the mutual relations and unity 
which exist between intelligible and rational natures, you will 
at once ﬁ nd that not only is the angelic nature established in 
the human but also the human is established in the angelic. For 
it is created in everything of which the pure intellect has the 
most perfect knowledge and becomes one with it48.
Naturally, this mutual interpenetration of the minds of man and an 
angel as well as the perfect cognition by man of all other creatures is 
far from being actually present as natural and rightful possession in 
any single human being, nor can any single human individual in his 
or her ordinary material condition make use of that immense pool of 
information, allegedly at their disposal. For the case of Adam giving 
names to all things in Paradise is indicative of the condition of the 
ideal human nature, human nature as it existed in the original and pure 
God’s conception. This primordial human nature, created in its integ-
rity and purity in the image of God is what Eriugena calls Paradise:
  
Therefore the limits of human nature are to be considered as 
the upper and the lower boundaries of Paradise, beyond which 
no created nature may be supposed to exist49.
The correct understanding of Eriugena’s concept of Paradise as the 
primordial and perfect condition of human nature calls for some 
48. PP IV 780 B, 428; JEAUNEAU cit., 56-57: “Si intentus intellectualium et ratio-
nabilium naturarum reciprocam copulationem et unitatem inspexeris, invenies 
profecto et angelicam essentiam in humana, et humanam in angelica constitutam. 
In omni siquidem quodcunque purus intellectus perfectissime cognoscit, ﬁ t, eique 
unum efﬁ citur”. 
49. PP IV, 825 C, 481; JEAUNEAU cit., 119-120: “Considera ergo extremitates huma-
nae naturae veluti cuiuspiam paradisi terminos, sursum versus atque deorsum, 
extra quos nulla creata intelligitur natura”.
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sophistication. Eriugena asserts that Paradise is not the condition 
of man that obtained in a distant, primeval past, rather it is the state 
to be achieved as the ﬁ nal goal in the long process of cosmic return 
still to be accomplished in the future (provided that the temporal 
categories of sequence, past and future are at all applicable in a met-
aphysical context like the one discussed in Eriugena). It follows from 
that, that the total and perfect knowledge of all created reality is 
given man as an objective to be conquered rather than as something 
readily available. This interpretation, it seems, can be distilled from 
the following statements:
Therefore, not only is irrationality created in the mind, but 
also every species, difference and property of irrationality, and 
all things which are naturally learnt concerning it, since the 
knowledge of all these and similar things is established in it. 
(…) True knowledge of all these is implanted in human nature 
although it is concealed from her that she has it until she is 
restored to her pristine and integral condition, in which with 
all clarity she will understand the magnitude and the beauty of 
the image that is fashioned within her, and will no longer be in 
ignorance of anything which is established within for she will 
be encompassed by the divine Light and turned towards God 
in Whom she will enjoy the perspicuous vision of all thing50.
As one might easily expect in the Christian and Augustinian context 
in which Eriugena’s thought developed, the blame for the total loss 
of that universal and perfect knowledge that was once a preroga-
tive of man and which is sadly absent in man’s present condition, 
50. PP IV 769 B-C, 414-415; JEAUNEAU cit., 41-42: “Creata igitur in eo irrationabilitas, 
et omnes species, omnisque differentia, et proprietas ipsius irrationabilitatis, et 
omnia quae circa eam naturaliter cognoscuntur, quoniam horum omnium et 
similium notitia in ipso condita est (…). Quorum omnium vera cognitio humanae 
naturae insita est, quamvis adhuc inesse ei lateat se ipsam, donec ad pristinam 
integritatem restituatur, in qua magnitudinem et pulchritudinem imaginis 
in se conditae purissime intellectura est, et nihil eam latebit ex his quae in se 
condita sunt, divino lumine ambita et in deum conversa, in quo omnia perspicue 
contemplabitur”. 
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is attributed by Eriugena to original sin51. Yet the most deplorable 
effect of original sin was not the loss of the primeval knowledge of 
all things, but the forgetfulness of God and of man’s true nature that 
became part of the fallen condition of man.
However, even sin, grave as it was, could not totally wipe out 
God’s image impressed in man’s nature; and even in the present 
condition of man, that is after original sin, the hidden image of God 
can work in man and inspire him with longing for perfect happiness, 
and thus for coming back to God:
For most might and most wretched was that fall in which our 
nature lost the knowledge and the wisdom which had been 
planted in her, and lapsed into a profound ignorance of herself 
and her Creator, even though we understand that the desire for 
the bliss which she had lost remained with her even after the 
Fall, which would certainly not have been the case if she had 
lost all knowledge of herself and her God52.
As we have seen, the understanding of intelligo as found in John the 
Scot, is clearly different from that offered by Augustine and also 
from that implied in the Cartesian cogito. In Eriugena, the intel-
ligo as revealing the existence of the mind is merely the point of 
departure. It receives a grandiose development in the metaphysical 
scheme in which human mind as such is conceived as the “locus” 
of the constitution of created reality. The created things (except 
for man himself) receive their shapes and structures in and through 
human knowledge. This constitutive activity of human intellect is 
not arbitrary or willful: man is not the principal maker, but an in-
termediary; he is a “second creator,” and his productive activity is 
51. Cf. A. WOHLMAN, L’homme, le monde sensible et le péché dans la philosophie de Jean 
Scot Erigèn (Paris, 1987) 32 and f.
52. PP IV 777 C-D, 425; JEAUNEAU cit., 53: “Casus quippe illius maximus et miserri-
mus errat scientiam et sapientiam sibi insitam deserere, et in profundam ignoran-
tiam suimet et creatoris sui labi, quamvis appetitus beatitudinis, quam perdiderat, 
etiam post casum in ea remansisse intelligatur, qui in ea nullo modo remaneret, si 
se ipsam et deum suum omnino ignoraret”.
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only efﬁ cient on condition that he turns his spiritual look to God in 
contemplation. 
Constituted in human mind are both visible and invis-
ible things. The mind contains the immaterial reasons of material 
things, thus even material reality exists in man in an immaterial way, 
that is not as subject to dispersal. Eriugena’s conception of matter, 
modeled on that of Gregory of Nyssa appears to be closer to some 
contemporary theories than to the conception of matter as extended 
spatially formulated by Descartes.
The human intelligo in its function of revealing the totality of 
created reality is the intermediary through which all God’s creative 
activity passes towards its effects. Its role as the mediator for the 
totality of God’s inﬂ uence upon the created effects epitomizes the 
essence of human intelligence as God’s Image.
Knowing, as he does, all created essences (except for man him-
self), man is excluded from knowing his own essence; the “locus” for 
man’s essence is the Divine Mind and it is there that the concept 
of man resides. From the human perspective, however, even that 
ignorance of man’s own essence, a kind of “learned ignorance” is 
revealing: it is a revelation of the mysterious, inaccessible God.
